Wisdom Engine

Source: blog + substack (v3 unified) — 42,162 records total.

Footnotes [[1]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref1) United Philippine Lines, Inc v Metalsrussia Corp. Ltd. 1997 AMC 2131 at p. 2133 (S.D. N.Y. 1997). In this case, a letter of indemnity was issued for this purpose. [[2]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref2) Lickbarrow v Mason (1794) STR 683; [[3]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref3) Bowen LJ’s judgment in Sanders v Maclean (1883) 11 QB 304 at 341. [[4]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref4) The Hague-Visby Rules state that a Bill of Lading is an adequate receipt. An indemnity given by the shipper to the carrier is illegal and ineffective when the carrier has made an intentional misrepresentation about the state of the cargo. The Hague-Visby Rules do not contain detailed provisions regarding the legality of the custom of issuing clean bills for defective merchandise against a letter of indemnity from the shipper. [[5]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref5) Situations where the Bill of Lading may contain neither of the Hague, Hague-Visby Rules or even the Hamburg Rules are atypical (the Hague-Visby rules are most commonly used). [[6]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref6) “The International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law relating to Bills of Lading” was signed at Brussels on the 25th August 1925 [[7]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref7) “The International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law relating to Bills of Lading” was signed at Brussels on 25th August 1924 as amended by the Protocol signed at Brussels on 23rd February 1968 and by the Protocol that was signed at Brussels on 21st December 1972. [[8]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref8) Article III, Rule I [[9]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref9) Article III Rule II [[10]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref10) Article III Rule 6 [[11]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref11) Article IV Rule 5(a) [[12]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref12) Article 3 Rule 8 and Article V, but see Article VI [[13]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref13) Goode R., Commercial Law (2nd Ed) p.902. [[14]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref14) Dromgoole S. & Baatz Y “Interest in Goods” (2nd Ed) Chapter 22 [[15]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref15) The Carso 1930 AMC 1740 at p. 1758 (S.D. N.Y. 1930). [[16]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref16) Tetley, W. “Letters of Indemnity at Shipment and Letters of Guarantee at Discharge” [[17]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref17) Tetley,W. Marine Cargo Claims, 3rd Ed., Editions Yvon Blais, Montreal, 1988, at 821. [[18]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref18) Standard Chartered Bank v. Pakistan National Shipping Corporation and Others (№2) [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 684 at 688 (Q.B. Com Ct.). Lord Justice Evans, comments regarding Cresswell, J.’s statement in the Court of Appeal decision, approved with the assertions and additionally remarked: “This requirement of honest commerce is stringently enforced by the English Courts. If a false bill of lading is knowingly issued by the master or agent of the shipowner, and if the claimant was intended to rely on it and did rely upon it and as a result of doing so has suffered loss, then the shipowner is liable in damages for the tort of deceit”. (Standard Chartered Bank v. Pakistan National Shipping Corporation and Others (№2) (C.A.), supra note 1, at 221). See also Howard, T. & Davenport, B. “English Maritime Law Update 1994/95” (1996) 27 J. Mar. L. & Com. 427. [[19]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref19) Hazelwood, S.J. P & I Clubs: Law and Practice, 3rd Ed., LLP, London, 2000 at 179. [[20]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref20) Ibid. [[21]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref21) Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan Nation Shipping Corporation and Others (№2) (C.A.); Hunter Grain v. Hyundai (1993) 117 ALR 507 (Federal Court of Australia). [[22]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref22) Art. 3(4) of the Protocol to Amend the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading, Brussels, 23rd February, 1968 [the Hague/Visby Rules]. [[23]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref23) Art. 16(3)(b). [[24]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref24) Pomerene Bills of Lading Act (United States), 1916, 49 U.S. Code 102, addresses the practice of antedating. Section 22, protects parties who have relied on the date in the bill of lading to their detriment. It is uncommon for statute to include such protections. [[25]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref25) The Stone Gemini [[26]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref26) Pacific Carriers v BNP Paribas (High Court of Australia 5th Aug 2004) [[27]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref27) Collern & Co. v China Ocean Shipping Company [1993] P&I International 16 [[28]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref28) Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992, Section 2.2(a) [[29]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref29) The Stettin (1889) 14 P.D. 142; The Sormorskiy 3068 [1994] 2 Lloyds Rep. 266 {deals where the bill is mislaid}. [[30]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref30) Motis Exports v Dampskisselskabett AF 1912 [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. Affirmed [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 211 [[31]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref31) Pacific Carriers v BNP Paribas [[32]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref32) P&I Clubs (or Protection and Indemnity Clubs) are covered later in this paper in more detail. [[33]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref33) The Stone Gemini [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 255 (Federal Court of Australia) [[34]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref34) Leamthong v Artis [2004] EWHC 2226 [[35]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref35) Tetley, W [2004] ETL 287–344 [[36]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref36) See Hunter Grain v. Hyundai; Brown, Jenkinson & Co. v. Percy Dalton; Standard Chartered Bank v. Pakistan National Shipping; St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins v. Typin Steel. [[37]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref37) Brown, Jenkinson & Co., v. Percy Dalton, the court held that a letter of indemnity contract was illegal and unenforceable as the object of the contract was to commit a tort. See Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Chemoleum Corp. 1971 AMC 2605 (N.Y. Supr. Ct. App. Div), the majority of the court held that indemnity agreements are against to public policy and thus are not enforceable. [[38]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref38) See Brown, Jenkinson & Co. v. Percy Dalton, & Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Chemoleum Corp. [[39]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref39) See Shanghai Ocean-going Shipping Co. v. Xiamen Foreign Trade Co. recapitulated by Chen, at 92. [[40]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref40) Protection and Indemnity Clubs [[41]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref41) Gyselen, L. “P&I Insurance: The European Commission’s Decision Concerning the Agreement of the International Group of P&I Clubs,” in Marine Insurance at the Turn of the Millennium. M. Huybrechts (Ed.) Intersentia, Antwerpen, 1999, 181, at 181. [[42]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref42) Ibid., at 182. [[43]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref43) Tetley, W. International Maritime and Admiralty Law, Editions Yvon Blais, Montreal, 2002, at 591. [[44]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref44) Luddenke, at 36. [[45]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref45) Hazelwood, at 179. [[46]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref46) Ibid. The American Steamship Owners Mutual Protection and Indemnity Association Form Policy, encompasses cargo liability in stipulation 7, but specifically excludes ante-dating in provision 7(g): “(7) Liability for loss of or damage to or in connection with cargo or other property (except mail or parcels post), including baggage and personal effects of passengers, to be carried, carried or which has been carried on board the insured vessel. Provided, however, that no liability shall exist hereunder for: …(g) Loss, damage or expense arising from the intentional issuance of bills of lading prior to receipt of the goods described therein, or covering goods not received at all.” [[47]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref47) Hazelwood, at 179–180. [[48]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref48) The Stone Gemini [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 255, at 266 (Australian Federal Court. NSW). [[49]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref49) Tetley at 824. [[50]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref50) Ibid. [[51]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref51) Tetley, W [2004] ETL 287–344 [[52]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref52) Hare, J. Shipping Law & Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa, Junta & Co., Cape Town, 1999, at 459. [[53]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref53) Ibid., In the United States, the documentary credit is generally refered to as a ‘letter of credit’. [[54]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref54) Wilson, J. Carriage of Goods by Sea, 4th Ed. Longman, England, 2001, at 140. [[55]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref55) Ibid., at 140–141. [[56]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref56) Hare, at 459. [[57]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref57) Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits, 1993 Revision, International Chamber of Commerce Publication №500. A text of UCP 500 can be found at the site: http://www.iccwbo.org/. In the US, the Uniform Commercial Code, regulates documentary credits in a manner similar to that of the UCP 500. [[58]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref58) UCP 500, ibid., Art. 32. [[59]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref59) See Standard Chartered Bank v. Pakistan Nation Shipping Corporation and Others (№2) (C.A.). [[60]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref60) In Standard Chartered Bank v. Pakistan Nation Shipping Corporation and Others (№2) (C.A.), the carrier was held liable in the tort of deceit for antedating bills of lading in exchange for a letter of indemnity. The Court held that the carrier would have no defence to the bank’s claim, who was the holder of the bill of lading, and that the carrier was held to the same standard of commercial honesty that was required form the other parties to the letter of credit transaction. [[61]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref61) Parker, B. “Liability for Incorrectly Clausing Bills of Lading” [2003] LMCLQ 201, at 205. For example see Brown Jenkinson v Percy Dalton, discussing fraudulent misrepresentation with regard to the issuance of clean bills of lading in exchange for letters of indemnity. For cases dealing generally with the tort of negligence and the tort of deceit, see The Saudi Crown [1986] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 261 (Q.B. Adm. Ct), Standard Chartered Bank v. Pakistan National Shipping Corporation and Others (№2) (C.A), and Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd. [1963] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 485 (H.L.). [[62]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref62) Ibid., at 258. The 1994 regulations that required ‘fairness’ were the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1994 (U.K). [[63]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref63) ICC International Maritime Bureau, “A Profile on Maritime Fraud”, August 1982. [[64]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref64) Ibid., at 252, citing Nicholas, B. “The Obligation to Disclose Information” in D.R. Harris and D. Tallon, Contract Law Today, Oxford, 1989, 166. The obligation to inform, or the obligation to disclose, arises most commonly in English law in the context of the question of “whether…a right to rescind [a contract] should arise where a contracting party had failed to disclose information that would have affected the other party’s decision to enter the contract.” There are, unique instances in English law where a duty to disclose does arise; Beatson, Anson’s Law of Contract, Oxford, 1998, at 257–269. [[65]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref65) [1985] AC 424, at 439. [[66]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref66) Ibbetson, at 252, taking special note of Beatson, J. “Has the Common Law a Future”[1997] CLJ 291, at 303–307. [[67]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref67) Hunter Grain v. Hyundai, holding the carrier responsible for accepting a letter of indemnity in exchange for a clean bill of lading. [[68]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref68) Ibid. See also Brown Jenkinson v. Percy Dalton, Standard Chartered Bank v. Pakistan Nation Shipping Corporation and Others (№2) (C.A.) supra note 1; United Baltic Corp. v. Dundee Perth & London Shipping Co. (1928) 32 Ll. L. Rep. 272, where the practice of issuing letters of indemnity was criticized by the court, with Wright J. using particularly strong language at p. 272: “The practice of issuing clean bills of lading when goods are damaged is very reprehensible. It leads to trouble, and the people who do it ought to suffer.” [[69]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref69) See Tetley, “Chapter 38: Letters of Indemnity and of Guarantee” at 821, who, at p. 823, states that “letters of indemnity should not be condoned, by the courts, or by commerce, rather they should be discouraged.” See also Hazelwood, at 178. [[70]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref70) See Brown Jenkinson v. Percy Dalton, supra note 1, where the Court of Appeal held that the indemnity was unenforceable because it was an illegal contract, with the purpose of perpetrating fraud on the buyer. See also the Hamburg Rules, which dictate in Article 17.3 that the carrier will have no right of indemnity against the shipper if his intention in issuing the clean bill of lading was to defraud a third party, including a consignee, who acts in reliance on the description of the goods in the bill of lading. [[71]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref71) UNCTAD 2003 [[72]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref72) Tetley, at 824. See also Bokalli, at 118, framing the problem from the point of view of the insurance companies, who, once the good have arrived damaged, pay out and then are subrogated into the rights of the consignees. These firms are often left without recourse as the carrier claims that the damage falls into one of the exculpatory provisions. [[73]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref73) In Xiamen Special Zone Jijian Trade Co. v. Tianjing Ocean Shipping Co. (reported by Xia Chen, “Chinese Law on Carriage of Goods by Sea under Bills of Lading” (1999) 8 Currents Int’l Trade L. J. 89, at 93.) the consignee suspected fraud in the form of antedated bills of lading, however the evidence was not sufficient to unequivocally prove the fraud. The consignee then obtained a court order that mandated that the vessel provide all information related to the loading, and the Court itself also undertook its own investigation. Upon completion of the investigations, the Court held that there was in fact fraud and the carrier was liable. In commentary on the above decision, it has been noted that it is “often not easy for a cargo consignee to prove such fraud between the shipper and the carrier without having been present at the time of loading. [In the above case] the petitioner obtained the court’s order to preserve evidence on board the vessel, in addition to interviewing the vessel’s officials and other crew members and inspecting the cargo by professionals. In the meantime the court also launched an investigation of its own in accordance with Article 74 of the Law of Civil Procedure which provides that when there exists a danger that evidence may disappear or when it is difficult to gather evidence, the parties involved may petition the court for an order to preserve evidence and the court may also initiate its own efforts in preserving the evidence.” (Ibid., at 93). [[74]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref74) Derry v. Peek (1889) 14 A.C. 337 (H.L.) at 374. [[75]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref75) Standard Chartered Bank v. Pakistan National Shipping Corporation and Others (№2), at 224. See also Gaskell, N. Bills of Lading: Law and Contracts, LLP, London, 2000 at 179: “…the act of knowingly issuing a false bill of lading is an intentional deceit or fraud.” [[76]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref76) Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping Corporation and Others (№2), ibid., at 221 and 224. [[77]](http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=5766614972114406938#_ftnref77) Tetley, W (2004) [2004] ETL 287–344

Cases Alimport v. Soubert Shipping Co. Ltd. [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 448 (Q.B. Com. Ct.) Amann Aviation Pty Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Australia (1991) 66 ALJR 123 (H.C. Aust.) Barclay’s Bank Ltd. v. Customs and Excise [1963] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 81 (Q.B. Com. Ct.) Berisford Metals Corp. v. S/S Salvador 1986 AMC 874 (2 Cir. 1985) Collern & Co. Ltd v. China Ocean Shipping Company [1993] P & I International 16 (Sup. Ct N.S.W.) Compania Naviera Vascongada v. Churchill [1906] 1 K.B. 237 (K.B. Div.) Demsey & Associates v. S.S. Sea Star, 1970 AMC 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) Derry v. Peek (1889) 14 A.C. 337 (H.L.) Donahue v. Stevenson [1932] AC 562 (H.L.) East West Corp. v. DKBS 1912 [2003] 2 All ER 700 (C.A.) Encyclopedia Britannica v. SS Hong Kong Producer 1969 AMC 1741(2 Cir. 1969) Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd. [1963] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 485 (H.L.) Hunter Grain v. Hyundai, (1993) 117 ALR 507 (Fed Ct, Aust.) Jenkins v. Livesey [1985] AC 424 (H.L) Kwel Tek Choa v. British Traders and Shippers Ltd [1954] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 16 (Q.B. Com Ct.) Leamthong v Artis [2004] EWHC 2226 Lickbarrow v Mason (1794) STR 683 Motis Exports Ltd. v. Dampkibsselskabet Af 1912 [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 837 (Q.B. Com. Ct.) Pacific Carriers Ltd. v. Banque Nationale de Paris, [2001] N.S.W.S.C. 900 (October 16 2001) (Unreported) (Sup. Ct. N.S.W.) Pacific Carriers v BNP Paribas (High Court of Australia 5th Aug 2004) Peer Voss v. APL Co. Pte Limited [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 707 (Singapore C.A.) Pickard v. Spears (1837) 112 E.R. 179 (H.L.) Renard Constructions Pty v. Minister for Public Works (1992) 26 NSW LR 234 (NSW C.A.) Sanders v Maclean (1883) 11 QB 304 at 341 Standard Chartered Bank v. Pakistan National Shipping Corporation and Others (№2) [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 684 (Q.B. Com. Ct.) The Aegean Sea [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 39 (Q.B. Com Ct.) The Carso 1930 AMC 1740 at p. 1758 (S.D. N.Y. 1930). The Ines [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 144 (Q.B. Com Ct.) The Nea Tyhi [1982] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 607 (Q.B. Com. Ct.) The New York Star [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 217 (P.C) The Rafaela S [2003] EWCA Civ 556,[2003] All E.R. (D) 289 (Apr.) (C.A.) The Sagona [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 194 (Q.B. Com. Ct.) The Saudi Crown [1986] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 261 (Q.B. Adm. Ct.) The Stettin (1889) 14 P.D. 142 The Sormovskiy 3068 [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 266 (Q.B. Adm. Ct.) The Stone Gemini [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 255 (Fed. Crt., Aust, NSW Adm.) The Zhi Jiang Kou [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 493 (C.A. N.S.W.) United Baltic Corp. v. Dundee Perth & London Shipping Co. (1928) 32 Ll. L. Rep. 272 United Philippine Lines, Inc v Metalsrussia Corp. Ltd. 1997 AMC 2131 (S.D. N.Y. 1997) Statues and Regulations Bills of Lading Act (1855) 18 & 19 Vict. c. 111. (U.K.) Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992, U.K. c. 50 Limitation Act 1980, U.K Misrepresentation Act 1967, U.K. c. 7 Pomerene Bills of Lading Act 1916, 49 U.S. Code 102 Protocol to Amend the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading, Brussels, February 23, 1968 Rome Convention 1980 E.E.C. 80/934, signed at Rome, June 19, 1980 Swedish Maritime Code, 1994, 2nd Ed. Andrea Upplagan T.O.M. 30 June 2000, Stockholm Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1994, U.K United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, Hamburg, March 31,1978 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Vienna, April 11, 1980 U.S. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), April 16, 1936, ch. 229, Sec. 1, 49 Stat. 1207

- Innovation Ecosystem Theory: This theory posits that a firm’s innovation capacity is influenced by its connections within a larger ecosystem of stakeholders, including other businesses, government, and industry associations (Arenal et al., 2020; Asplund et al., 2021; Dodgson et al., 2013; Nylund et al., 2021). While this theory does not have a single specific creator, numerous scholars have developed and elaborated the idea in innovation studies over many years. It suggests that a firm’s innovation ability is shaped by its connections to a broader network or “ecosystem” of other firms, institutions, and stakeholders. In today’s interconnected global economy, this theory highlights the importance of strategic partnerships, collaborations, and industry alliances in driving innovation - Organizational Culture Theory: This perspective suggests that organizational culture factors like psychological safety, collectivism, and power distance can significantly impact innovation performance. Psychological safety and collectivism generally positively impact innovation, while high power distance (a hierarchical culture) can have a negative effect (Kwantes & Boglarsky, 2007; Lee et al., 2019; Schneider et al., 2013). Likewise, this theory is the product of contributions from many scholars over time. It posits that the culture of an organization – its shared beliefs, values, and practices – can significantly impact the organization’s ability to innovate. In the modern business context, companies increasingly focus on fostering cultures that encourage creativity, risk-taking, and collaboration as critical drivers of innovation. - Open Innovation Theory: This theory, proposed by Henry Chesbrough, suggests that companies can and should use internal and external theories and paths to market as they seek to advance their technology (de Jong et al., 2010; van de Vrande et al., 2010). Henry Chesbrough (2003) challenges the traditional notion of innovation being driven solely by internal R&D, instead suggesting that businesses should leverage internal and external ideas and pathways to advance their technology. Today, many companies use this approach, partnering with external researchers, customers, or even competitors to drive innovation. - Diffusion of Innovations Theory: This theory, developed by Everett Rogers, describes how, over time, an idea or product gains momentum and diffuses (or spreads) through a particular population or social system (Rogers, 2010). Everett Rogers developed a theory to explain how innovations spread through populations over time. Businesses today use this theory to guide their marketing and adoption strategies, helping ensure that their creations reach as wide an audience as possible. - Disruptive Innovation Theory: Proposed by Clayton Christensen, this theory suggests that a smaller company with fewer resources can successfully challenge established incumbent businesses by targeting segments of the market that have been neglected by the incumbents, typically because it is not profitable at the time (Christensen et al., 2006; Liversidge, 2015; Si & Chen, 2020). Clayton Christensen (2004) introduced a theory to describe how smaller, less-resourced companies can challenge established businesses by targeting neglected market segments. Today, this theory can be seen in many industries where start-ups have disrupted incumbents, such as Uber in transportation and Airbnb in hospitality. - Resource-Based View (RBV): This theory posits that the competitive advantage of a firm lies primarily in the concentration of a bundle of valuable resources at the firm’s disposal (Barney & Arikan, 2005; Mele & Della Corte, 2013). Jay Barney and Birger Wernerfelt (Lazonick, 2002) posit that competitive advantage lies primarily in applying a bundle of valuable resources at a firm’s disposal. In today’s business, companies are more focused than ever on leveraging their unique resources and capabilities, whether proprietary technology, talented employees, or powerful brand identities, to innovate and achieve competitive advantage.

Bibliography 1. Anderson, C. (1975) “Admiralty Law Institute: Symposium on Charter Parties: Time and Voyage Charters: Proceeding to Loading Port, Loading, and Related Problems” 49 Tul. L. Rev. 880 2. Beatson, J. (1998) Anson’s Law of Contract, Oxford University Press, Oxford 3. Beatson, J. “Has the Common Law a Future” [1997] CLJ 291 4. Chan, F. (1999) “A Plea for Certainty: Legal and Practical Problems in the Presentation of Non-Negotiable Bills of Lading” 29 Hong Kong L. J. 44 5. Derrington, S & White, W. (2002) “Australian Maritime Law Update: 2001” 33 JMLC 275 6. Dromgoole S. & Baatz Y (1992) “Interest in Goods” (2nd Ed) Chapter 22 7. Gaskell, N. et al., (2000) “Bills of Lading: Law and Contracts”, LLP, London 8. Hazelwood, S.J. (2000) “P & I Clubs: Law and Practice”, 3rd Ed. LLP, London 9. Howard, T. & Davenport, B. (1996) “English Maritime Law Update 1994/95” 27 J. Mar. L. & Com. 427 10. Ibbetson, A (1999) “Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations”, Oxford University Press, Oxford 11. International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, (1994) UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts. Available Online at: http://www.unidroit.org/english/presentation/main.htm 12. Keily, T. (1999) “Good Faith and the Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG)” 3 Vindobona Journal of International Commercial Law and Arbitration, 15 13. Myburgh, P.A. (1995) “Current Developments Concerning the Form of Bills of Lading — New Zealand” in Ocean Bills of Lading: Traditional Forms, Substitutes, and EDI Systems, A.N. Yiannopoulos (Ed.), Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1995, 237 14. Nicholas, B. (1989) “The Obligation to Disclose Information” in Contract Law Today, D.R. Harris and D. Tallon (Eds), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989, 169 15. Parker, B. (2003) “Liability for Incorrectly Clausing Bills of Lading” [2003] LMCLQ 204 16. Rutten, Lamon (UNCTAD), (2004) “A Primer on New Techniques Used By The Sophisticated Financial Fraudster (With Special Reference to Commodity Market Instruments)” UNCTAD/DITC/COM/39 (7th March 2003) UNCTAD secretariat 17. Sharpe, D. (1995) “Recent Developments in Maritime Law” 19 Mar. Law. 301 18. Tetley, William (1985) “Maritime Liens & Claims”, 1st Ed., 1 19. Tetley, William (1994) “International Conflict of Laws”, 1st Ed., 20. Tetley, William (1998) “Maritime Liens & Claims”, 2 Ed., 21. Tetley, William (2003) “International Maritime and Admiralty Law”, 1st Ed., 2003 22. Tetley, William (2004) “Glossary of Maritime Law Terms”, 1st Ed., viewed at: http://www.mcgill.ca/maritimelaw/glossaries/maritime/ 23. Tetley, William (2004) “Good Faith in Contract, Particularly in the Contracts of Arbitration and Chartering (Corrective vs. Distributive Justice)” 35 JMLC 561–616. 24. Tetley, William (2004) “Letters of Indemnity at Shipment and Letters of Guarantee at Discharge” [2004] ETL 287–344. 25. Todd, P. (1990) “Modern Bills of Lading”, Blackwell law, Oxford 26. Weale, John (2004) “Letters of Indemnity: Some Practical Considerations” Maritime Arbitrators of Canada 27. Wilson, J.F. (2001) “Carriage of Goods by Sea”, 4th Ed. Longman, Harlow, UK 28. Yiannopoulos, A.N. (1995) “XIVth International Congress of Comparative Law: Current Developments Concerning the Form of Bills of Lading” in Ocean Bills of Lading: Traditional Forms, Substitutes, and EDI Systems. A.N. Yiannopoulos (Ed.), Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1995, 3

- A temporal relationship where the cause always precedes the outcome. If there is some factor that is believed to cause an event, then it must always necessarily precede the event. The first criteria is the most critical and essential of all of Hill’s criteria. If the first criteria is not true, then we have a correlation alone and no causal effect. - Next, we need to consider the strength of the relationship. It is a statistical measure of the strength where the factors are highly related. We can look at the Pearson number for correlation as a means of testing the value. - Next, there is an effect-response relationship. It is a measure of input. As we increase the amount of one factor, the other must also increase. For instance, if we put more time into training people in security awareness, then naturally, for it to be causal in the relationship we would have to have improved security. The improvement is not required to be linear, and we may find that each incremental expense returns less, but it must return something more than it would’ve if it wasn’t there. - The fourth relationship is consistency. The results need to be replicable and repeatable. They should apply in different population groups and samples. - Next, we look at plausibility. The association that we are purporting exists needs to be supported by a valid theoretical basis. There needs to be some phenomena that can act in a manner that causes the result or event. - The sixth criteria is that we consider alternative explanations. Many so-called scientists fail here. They merely assume a relationship matches with their understanding. It may be true that we can dismiss many arguments out of hand as they have already been investigated and shown to be false, but it does not mean that we do not consider alternative explanations. We must always consider multiple hypotheses prior to making any conclusion about a causal relationship between events we seek to explain and investigate. - Experimental evidence is also important. Even though we cannot expect to completely re-create an event, we should be able to implement an appropriate experimental regime that supports our causal argument. - Next, there is a requirement that the causal effect is specific. It is one of the weaker criteria, and we can demonstrate causal effects without it. The absence of specificity does not negate a causal relationship, but the existence of specificity between associations does add additional support to the existence of a causal relationship. Here it is important to always examine specific causal relationships within a larger systemic environment. - Lastly, we have coherence. Ideally, any association we are purporting exists should fit within the body of existing theory and knowledge. There are ways, of course, to introduce new theory, and Thomas Kuhn referred to the changes to the accepted theoretical basis of science as a “paradigm shift.” To reject the existing theoretical basis of science, we need to have particularly good and strong proof and evidence supporting our new claim of causality.

- Note that the linked article includes the original quote still online saying that there were 144 blocks on a daily basis. It is best practice to ensure that you have capacity to handle multiple times the levels of data that is to be received at any time, because you can never predict whether data bursts will happen. Consequently, at the time, to replicate Visa would have required 2GB to 3GB blocks. Today, the same would require 5GB to 6GB blocks with the changes in the protocol. Integrating other payment forms such as MasterCard would require 8GB to 10GB blocks. - Note that 2 HD movies account for seven to nine gigabytes of information. - This does not mean that a developer group can centrally manage and control changes. Rather, it means nobody, including a plurality of developers, can make changes without the system being centralised. The only way Bitcoin or any blockchain functions as a decentralised entity or exchange or process or anything is one where the protocol is set and never to change again. Once it cannot change, once there are no changes ever made to the protocol (note it is not the same as the software), then the system can be called decentralised. If, at any time, developers can propose and make changes, the system is centralised by definition. - Note that the acceptance and the voting is purely carried out by nodes which are defined in section 5 of the white paper and commonly called miners or mining pools. There is no methodology for any system to vote in Bitcoin, or any other blockchain network based on a proof-of-work system, other than through the creation of blocks. Consequently, the only systems in Bitcoin that can enforce rules are nodes, and such nodes are miners. Any system that is not mining in creating blocks is not voting or having any impact on the nature of the system or enforcing rules. Importantly, any needed rules and incentives can be enforced, which means law and court orders were always a part of the protocol. The methodologies for doing so may vary, but it is premised on the fact that only a few large commercial systems will exist. As in the image, we can see it already today. Despite the false narratives and misleading information, and for that matter downright fraudulent representation, promoted by criminal groups, in relation to how Bitcoin would work with thousands of nodes, Bitcoin is a system that, at scale, is designed purposefully to allow interaction through law enforcement. Even systems copying Bitcoin, such as the BTC system, are subject to it in the same way.

- Archive Nodes: Archive nodes are computers or devices that maintain a complete copy of the entire blockchain. These nodes do not validate and verify transactions and blocks. While these have been falsely referred to as a “Full node”, the only activity these engage in is storing and propagating a limited subset of the transaction history. In the Bitcoin network, archive nodes are promoted as maintaining the integrity of the blockchain and participating in the consensus mechanism. However, the only nodes that validate and verify transactions are those defined within section 5 of the White Paper, also called mining nodes. - Mining Nodes: Mining nodes are the only system that could be correctly called a full node as these engage in the mining process, where they compete to solve computationally-intensive puzzles to add new blocks to the blockchain. Mining nodes validate transactions and create new blocks containing validated transactions. They contribute computational power to the network and are responsible for securing and extending the blockchain. - Lightweight (SPV) Nodes: Simplified Payment Verification (SPV) nodes, also known as lightweight nodes, do not store the entire blockchain but rely on full nodes for transaction verification. These nodes maintain a limited set of data, typically storing only the block headers, and use Merkle proofs to verify the inclusion of transactions within specific blocks. SPV nodes provide a lighter-weight option for users who don’t require entire transaction history. - Network Connectivity: This operational definition refers to the ability of a node to connect and communicate with other nodes in the network. Nodes must establish and maintain network connections to exchange information, propagate transactions and blocks, and participate in the consensus process. Network connectivity can be measured by the number of links a node has or the quality of its connections. - Consensus Participation: This definition encompasses the active involvement of nodes in the consensus mechanism of the blockchain network. In the Bitcoin network, nodes participate in the consensus process by following the proof-of-work algorithm, contributing computational power to mine new blocks, and validating transactions. The level of participation can be assessed based on the computational resources dedicated to mining or the frequency of validation and propagation of transactions. - Node Diversity: It refers to the variety of node types and their distribution within the network. This operational definition considers the presence of full nodes, mining nodes, SPV nodes, and other specialized nodes. Node diversity can influence the decentralization and resilience of the network, as different types of nodes contribute unique functionalities and help maintain a distributed ecosystem.

- Multi-Currency Support: The wallet must support multiple currencies, including CBDCs, to enable seamless transfers and conversions. - CBDC Integration: It must integrate with the central bank’s CBDC infrastructure to ensure compatibility and interoperability. - KYC and Tax Compliance: Incorporate robust Know Your Customer (KYC) procedures to verify users’ identities and facilitate tax reporting for transactions exceeding certain thresholds. - Government Linkage: Establish a secure linkage with government systems to facilitate the recording and sharing of relevant payment and tax information. - Threshold Monitoring: Monitor transaction amounts and trigger additional KYC and tax reporting requirements when government-set thresholds are reached. - Privacy and Security: Implement robust encryption and authentication mechanisms to safeguard sensitive information. - Multilingual Interface: Ensure the wallet is accessible by supporting various languages. - User-Friendly Experience: The interface should be intuitive and easy for experienced and novice users to navigate. - Low Transaction Costs: Leverage efficient blockchain technology and optimization strategies to provide cost-effective remittance services. - Reliable Customer Support: Offer a responsive customer support system to promptly address user queries, concerns, and technical issues. - Scalability and Performance: The wallet should be designed to handle a high volume of transactions and accommodate future growth in user adoption. - Regulatory Compliance: The wallet must adhere to local and international regulations, including anti-money laundering (AML), counter-terrorism financing (CTF) measures, and data protection laws. - Integration with Communication Platforms: Enhance social connectivity by allowing users to communicate directly with their families and support networks through the wallet interface. - Currency Exchange Functionality: Incorporate a user-friendly and secure digital currency exchange feature, providing competitive rates and quick transactions. - Wallet Accessibility: Ensure that the wallet can be accessed across multiple devices and platforms, allowing users to access their funds anytime, anywhere. - Cross-Border Transactions: Support seamless and efficient cross-border transactions, considering international transfer protocols and regulatory compliance. - Real-Time Transaction Processing: Ensure the system can handle and process transactions in real-time, providing users with immediate confirmation and reducing transaction time. - Disaster Recovery and Business Continuity Plan: Implement a robust disaster recovery and business continuity plan to protect data and ensure system functionality in the event of any operational disruptions or security threats. - Software Updates and Maintenance: Regularly update software to enhance security, fix bugs, and improve user experience. - Interoperability: The wallet should be interoperable with other systems and platforms, facilitating easy integration and compatibility with other financial tools and services.

- Transaction Throughput: This refers to the number of transactions the blockchain network processes within a given time frame. It is essential to define the specific unit of time (e.g., transactions per second, transactions per minute) to measure the scalability of the network accurately. - Confirmation Time: It represents the time a transaction takes to be confirmed and added to the blockchain. This definition should include whether it refers to the time taken for a transaction to be included in a block or the time for a certain number of blocks to be added on top of the block containing the transaction. - Block Size: It defines the maximum allowable size of a block in the blockchain. This can be measured in terms of bytes or other relevant units. The block size plays a crucial role in determining the scalability of the network since it affects the number of transactions that can be included in each block. - Network Latency: This refers to the time delay experienced in propagating information across the blockchain network. Network latency can impact the overall performance and scalability of the network; thus, it should be defined and measured consistently. - Node Count: It represents the total number of active nodes participating in the blockchain network. The number of nodes can significantly affect the network’s scalability, and defining the exact criteria for determining active nodes is essential. - Consensus Mechanism: It refers to the specific algorithm or protocol used by the blockchain network to achieve consensus among nodes. The consensus mechanism can impact scalability, and its operational definition should include details about the specific algorithm used and any associated parameters. - Computational Power: It defines the processing capabilities of individual nodes in the blockchain network. Computational power can influence the speed at which transactions are validated and added to the blockchain. Therefore, the operational definition should include the specific metric used to measure computational power, such as the hash rate or processing speed. - Scalability Metric: This encompasses the specific metric or criteria used to evaluate the scalability of the blockchain network. It could be transaction throughput, confirmation time, or any other measurable factor determining the network’s ability to handle increased transaction volume.

Turing’s paper is premised on Godel’s (1931). Unfortunately, if you do not have the mathematical background in the form of discrete maths that the authors were writing about, you are likely to make one of the many errors that people make when it comes to the definition of a Turing machine. For example, Turing had noted (1936, p.230) that the class of computable numbers was “nevertheless enumerable”. But, he did not say that the Turing machine itself needed to be enumerable for all else to be true. Turing was extending the research of Church (1936), who was researching the concept of ‘effective calculability’. As Turing noted, effective calculability, whilst separately defined, is functionally equivalent to Turing’s concept of ‘computability’. For the same reason, it has been called the Church-Turing problem. Each author created a solution, with Church deriving his first. Hennie (1965) investigated the concept of a single-tape, offline Turing machine. Such a machine and tape can be used for computation as needed and created in a structured manner, that can be later produced to validate any single computable number. An example of how such a machine would be reflected in Bitcoin script would be to create a set of rules and mathematical processes that can compute any digital number on a tape that may then be processed. As such, we can analogise the tape to the Bitcoin script. In the same way, you could imagine creating a single transaction as a single tape compiled and produced offline but used online, within finite time. Hartmanis (1968) provided a discussion around the complexity of single-tape Turing machines. Whilst Hartmanis noted that regular sets of sequences are sharply time-bound, various forms of computational complexity could be used to measure such forms of computation. Simultaneously, it is possible to determine the different complexity levels for such tapes and compare them to those for multiple-tape machines. Various forms of computational complexity have thus been derived. So, the question is now not whether a script presents a Turing-complete system, but whether it is efficient. Of course, a single-tape computation is inefficient, and it is not one that I would recommend, but it is feasible and possible to implement.

- Alice sends a transaction where the nLockTime value is set to a date in the future. We can start with anything, but by default we would start at a sequence number of 0. - The miners will not recognise this transaction to be valid, and thus, it is not “final”. The network of miners will not include it in a block before it is final, and that will only occur when the nLockTime value has been reached. - As the transaction cannot be included in a block until the time specified in the nLockTime is reached, there is a final state that both parties have agreed to and also the ability to send updated transactions. If there is a 2-of-3 address, the parties can use an escrow (such as a licenced shared registry) to ensure that a transaction that has been agreed is final. If not, we can also have the parties negotiate and allow a means to “pull out” of the negotiation at any time before the nLockTime deadline. - Using this method, and prior to when the set nLockTime is reached, the users can replace the transaction with a higher-version transaction. A higher sequence number is a newer version that replaces the ones before. That is, the network will accept the highest sequence number for transactions once the nLockTime has been reached, rejecting all others with a lower value. - The negotiations can also be finalised. If a party sets the sequence number to UINT_MAX, the transaction is considered as being finalised by the miners. No replacement can occur. When the sequence equals UINT_MAX, miners will no longer accept a replacement transaction even where the nLockTime value remains in the future. - If you ever want to lock the transaction permanently, you can set the sequence number to UINT_MAX. Then the transaction is considered to be final, even if the time represented in nLockTime remains in the future.

- Offline Functionality: The wallet should support some degree of offline functionality for users with intermittent internet access. This can be crucial in certain regions where internet connectivity is inconsistent, ensuring that users can still view their balance and transaction history and prepare transactions for when they next have internet access. - Disaster Recovery: The wallet should incorporate a robust backup and disaster recovery strategy to protect user data and funds in case of unforeseen incidents. This includes encrypted backups of the user’s private keys that can be recovered with a passphrase known only to the user. - Accessibility Features: The wallet should include features that make it accessible to all users, including those with disabilities. This includes support for screen readers, high contrast modes, and other assistive technologies. - Customizable Security Settings: While maintaining high minimum security standards, the wallet should also offer customizable security settings for advanced users. These might include more complex multi-signature transactions, time-locked transactions, and other advanced security features. - Fee Management: The wallet should provide transparent information about transaction fees and offer options for users to manage these fees when network congestion varies. This may include a sliding scale for urgency versus cost or the ability to replace transactions with higher fee versions if they are not confirmed quickly enough. - Open-Source Code: Providing open-source code for the wallet software can encourage trust and transparency. It allows the community to review the code, find and fix bugs, and ensure no hidden malicious functions exist. - Blockchain Education: To maximize user engagement and trust, the wallet should include educational resources that explain how the blockchain and cryptocurrencies work, how to securely manage and recover keys, how to interpret transaction information, and how to avoid common scams and pitfalls. - Sustainability: Lastly, consideration of the environmental impact of the wallet’s operation, including the blockchain’s energy consumption, could be a selling point for environmentally-conscious users.

- Shipper: Information about the party or company that is shipping the goods. - Consignee: Information about the party or company that is receiving the goods. - Carrier: Information about the shipping carrier or transportation company responsible for transporting the goods. - Notify Party: Optional field to specify a third party to be notified about the arrival or status of the goods. - Port of Loading: The name of the port where the goods are loaded onto the vessel. - Port of Discharge: The name of the port where the goods will be unloaded from the vessel. - Vessel/Voyage: Details about the vessel name and voyage number identify the specific vessel and voyage on which the goods will be transported. - Bill of Lading Number: A unique identifier assigned to the Bill of Lading for reference and tracking purposes. - Description of Goods: A detailed description of the goods being shipped, including the type of goods, quantity, weight, packaging, and any special instructions or handling requirements. - Marks and Numbers: Unique markings or labels on the packaging or containers used to identify and track the goods. - Gross Weight/Net Weight: The total weight of the goods, including the weight of packaging (gross weight) and the weight of the goods alone (net weight). - Measurement: The dimensions or size of the shipment, including length, width, and height. - Freight Charges: Information about the freight charges associated with the shipment, including the currency and payment terms. - Incoterms: The International Commercial Terms (Incoterms) that specify the rights and responsibilities of the buyer and seller regarding the shipment and delivery of the goods. - Date of Shipment: The date when the goods are loaded onto the vessel. - Signature: Signatures of the authorized representatives from the shipper, carrier, and consignee, acknowledging their agreement to the terms and conditions of the Bill of Lading.

Dominis suis omnibus Hugonis de Gurnay et amicis et hominibus francis et anglis salutem. Sciatis quod ego et Mileseint sponsa mea et Hugo filius meus concedimus canonicis de Messend’ et carta nostra confirmauimus et garantizamus totam tenuram suam de Browton’ quam de Roberto Mansello tenebant cum omnibus appendiciis suis in bosco et plano et cunctis aliis rebus ad feudum illud pertinentibus ad tenendum de nobis et heredibus nostris et nominatim de uxore mea Mileseint cui in dote uillam illam dedimus ad tenendum insuper libere et quiete et hereditarie in perpetuam elemosinam per idem seruicium quod inde Roberto Mansel faciebant. Scilicet reddendo annuatim pro omnibus seruiciis vi marcas ad Pascha quas canonici vi marcas solebant reddere Roberto ad duos terminos scilicet Pasche Sancti Michaelis sed amodo reddentur simul ad Pascha et statuent unum canonicorum in ecclesia sua omnibus diebus pro salute nostra et antecessorum et successorum nostrorum. Et si ad eos de aliquo grauidi negotio nostro breue nostrum miserimus abbas aut aliquis de canonicis ibit pro nobis ad regem sine ad episcopum infra Angliam quin etiam ut omnis calumnia et querele heredum predicti Roberti tollantur. Sciant omnes amici nostri presentes et futuri nos pari assensu et concessione dedisse Stephano heredi predicti Roberti escambias in socha de Cheneborlay nominatim in Carlinton’ iiii marcatas terre illo in manu mea supradictam Brottone liberam dimittente et de escambiis mihi et Hugonis filio meo hominem suum faciente. Vt autem de hiis qui in presenti carta continentur nulla sit in posteris dubietas sigillum meum et sigillum sponse mee Millicent hic apponuntur. Testibus Nicholas Estoteuilla, Iohanne de Hosdeng, Willelmo de Sancto Luciano, Willelmo de Bossoncort, Hugone Heusart, Willelmo de Marteneio, Garnero Hosdent, Hugone de Braimoster, Reynardo de Mereuill, Radulfo de Ogia, Galtero thesaurio de Auesnes, Rogero capellano qui hanc cartam scripsit. Hec facta sunt apud Gornaium anno dominice incarnacionis MC sexagesimo vii pridie Nonarum Aprilis.

When one party is willing to compromise, it is the unreasonable person who wins. It takes two people to debate a position, yet it only requires one to compromise. As in the situation of Chamberlain, when one party remains immovable, and the other is willing to compromise, there is no meeting in the middle. Compromise is not based on fact. It is not based on evidence. A willingness to re-evaluate a position through an analysis of fact is rational and laudable, which is not the same as to compromise. There are times when it would seem a compromise could achieve gains. Yet such gains lie not in the compromise, but are instead the result of trading positions and negotiating a settlement that favours all parties. There are scenarios where win-win outcomes are possible, yet to believe that all conflict should be avoided and that compromise is always necessary is to fall into the fallacy of the golden mean (Lambdin, 2006). Whether we call it argument from middle ground, the continuum fallacy, or the fallacy of gray, the argument to moderation or argumentum ad temperantiam is the trap that has been set and that we in the West, in our pluralistic civilisation, have fallen into—without knowing our plight (Bukovsky, 1990). As we face intransient opponents who are recalcitrant and firm in their conviction even when faced with evidence refuting their position, our way of life is slowly eroded. Each time we compromise and seemingly appease those with ideas that would once be considered abhorrent, such that we now allow for diversity, we erode the very foundations of liberal society. It is possible to have liberal views and allow freedom while still ensuring that we are open to being convinced of another path. But, being persuaded must necessitate evidence, and not mere compromise.

Any end-user transaction exchange in Bitcoin can be served by a destination wallet directly using a P2P exchange where a template is swapped and signed or sent to a known (even offline) address by sending directly to a node. A source wallet is the system that supplies access to the keys and systems where the initiation of an exchange (both lawful and illicit) is presented or created[[5]](#_ftn1). There are two significant differences involving the source wallet and the destination wallet when viewed under a regulatory framework. Firstly, the destination wallet serving ordinary end users is most unlikely to have any direct association with or precise information concerning the primary malfeasor, unless the wallet is involved with illegal activity (such as the Silk Road wallets), in which case it provides law enforcement with a source of all illegal transactions that can be traced. Any logs or materials that may be maintained are unlikely to hold the level of detail necessary to prove malfeasance from a merchant wallet that has recieved bitcoin that may have come from a “tainted” source. A source wallet conversely is likely to maintain logs and track access to the content that it maintains. It is necessary to weigh any process of assessing how “fair” it would be to “hold responsible” the merchant wallet for the misconduct of its clients or other parties and also in determining how successfully a wallet-service provider could serve as a regulator in controlling misconduct against a variety of factors. In many cases, the merchant wallet may be located in a jurisdiction without reciprocal regulations, thus preventing prosecution. Next, the merchant wallet may itself be a victim of illicit activity.

- Type of Goods: Specify the nature or type of goods being shipped, such as electronics, textiles, machinery, perishable goods, hazardous materials, etc. This information helps in determining appropriate handling and storage requirements. - Quantity: Indicate the quantity of goods being shipped. This could include the number of units, packages, pallets, or containers. - Weight: Provide the weight of the goods, which may include gross weight (total weight of the goods and packaging) and net weight (weight of the goods without packaging). It helps in determining transportation costs and ensuring compliance with weight restrictions. - Packaging: Describe the packaging used to contain the goods, such as cartons, drums, crates, or pallets. Mention any special packaging instructions if required. - Dimensions: If applicable, include the shipment’s measurements, such as length, width, and height. This information assists in space allocation and determining compatibility with transport equipment. - Marks and Numbers: Specify any unique marks, numbers, or labels associated with the packaging or containers. These markings identify and track the goods throughout the supply chain. In our example, we will gradually integrate them to allow for a global tracking system that traces logistics goods. But, this is only the first post. - Special Instructions: If there are any specific handling instructions or requirements for the goods, such as temperature control, ventilation, stacking limitations, or fragile handling, they should be mentioned clearly. - Harmonized System (HS) Codes: Include the appropriate HS codes that classify the goods based on internationally recognized coding systems. HS codes facilitate customs clearance and ensure accurate categorization of goods for regulatory and statistical purposes.

Banks primarily exist for the purpose of allocating funds gathered in the form of short term deposits and converting these into longer term loans. This process changes liquid funds into less liquid and riskier forms of capital (Fama, 1980; 1985; Diamond & Rajan, 2001). In consolidating depositor funds and providing credit, banks and related financial institutions reduce the amount of monitoring required in the allocation of capital (Gorton and Winton, 2003). This process lowers the overall cost of redistributing capital to its most effective use (Leland & Pyle, 1977; Diamond, 1984). The counter side to this benefit is an increase in risk to the bank which is compensated through its profit margin. This risk comes in the form of an imbalance in liquidity. Many banks have a greater liquidity of liabilities than of their assets. In many instances, the assets held as capital by banks a long-term are prone to market risk leaving the bank vulnerable to runs and market fluctuations. For this reason, banks can fail if they are unable to retain ongoing lines of credit to account for depositor withdrawals as well as due to large-scale repayment failures from their clients as happened in the 2007/2008 period. Instances where depositors have made runs on the bank can be started because of unsound economic conditions or even rumours. These scenarios can lead to even sound firms being left in a position that is insolvent as they are forced to sell assets to cover the withdrawal of funds to their depositors at an unfavourable rate(Diamond & Dybvig, 1983).

- Policy Paper: Develop a comprehensive policy paper that clearly outlines the benefits of the proposed system, backed by empirical data from the research conducted. This paper should explain how the micropayment system works, its potential economic impact, and the issues it seeks to address. It should also provide an analysis of potential challenges and regulatory considerations. - Meetings and Presentations: Request meetings with key policymakers, officials in financial regulatory bodies, and lawmakers in the U.S. and the targeted South and Central American countries. During these meetings, present the policy paper, elaborate on the concept, and discuss the potential benefits and implementation strategies of the micropayment system. - Stakeholder Engagement: Collaborate with relevant stakeholders such as migrant worker unions, financial institutions, fintech companies, and non-profit organizations advocating for migrant rights. Their support can significantly influence policymakers’ decisions and provide valuable insights to improve the proposed system. - Public Advocacy: Utilize media platforms to generate public awareness and support for the micropayment system. Publishing op-eds, giving interviews, and using social media can help explain the concept to the public, which can pressure policymakers to act. - Pilot Program: Propose a pilot program for the micropayment system in a selected area. Successful implementation and positive results from the pilot can serve as a robust proof-of-concept to persuade skeptical officials. - Legislative Proposals: Work with sympathetic lawmakers to draft legislative proposals that would facilitate the introduction and operation of the micropayment system. This could involve proposals for regulatory adjustments or establishing a legal framework that supports such financial innovations.

Just as choosing to believe that the world is flat and that the sun circles the earth would be erroneous if many people argued it, assuming that the interest is somewhere in the middle or the golden mean remains equally false. Truth is not determined by popular belief. Although none of us can achieve any result that perfects truth, we can get close. Both philosophical logic and modern scientific analysis allow us to look at a variety of separate premises and to find answers that come closer and closer to the truth. Science is a method. It does not answer all questions; more importantly, it merely approximates the reality we seek to explain. Yet again, over time, as we improve our techniques and gain more evidence, the scientific method allows us to get closer and closer to the truth. Some, such as Thomas Kuhn, have argued along similar lines, believing that science changes in paradigm shifts (1962/1970). A system as proposed by Kuhn would allow science to exist within a reality based on compromise. But, Kuhn’s concept of science was self-refuting, and has been repudiated by his own statements. One example would include relativity. Kuhn argued that structures such as relativistic physics had been introduced through a process of generational change, but the evidence stands against him. It was not paradigm changes and the shift of generational weight that brought in support for Einstein’s theory of relativity; it was the weight of evidence when experimental results demonstrated the theory to be sound (Rovelli, 2019).

- Nodes are miners, these are commercial entities that compete. - The aim is to remove all limits to scale as soon as possible. Then, and only then, to lock the base protocol and stop any arbitrary change. - SPV is safe and is all a user needs. - Layer 2 is IN SCRIPT. - Malleability is not a flaw. - All systems are based on risk. There is no form of absolute security, and miners must weigh costs as do consumers. - Bitcoin is pure capitalism. - Distributed and decentralised means that there are 3 or more miners with no group holding more than 50% control. - Bitcoin is all about economic incentives. - The system works as it is designed to allow miners to compete profitably. - You do not need to try and fix Bitcoin, it works, and it does not need to be perfect, it is competition that drives advancement. - Developers work for corporations to build software. - Privacy and confidentiality matter— these are distinct from anonymity (which is not a function of cash). - LAW is law, code is at best a form of evidence. - Patents are a means to encourage development. - Companies help to protect rights and allow us freedom from government and tyranny. - Only one coin can exist at scale. - There is no such thing as “permission-less” tokens or equity offerings. - ICOs are a scam. FULL STOP - A digital IPO, tokenised shares, equity, bonds, etc are NOT ICOs

In the instance that a merchant wallet supplies both the host that contains content and also the access to that material, it is likely to be able to more effectively monitor and control the activity of its users than a provider would that provides only access to the material. A user wallet cannot readily remove itself from the authority of the regulatory regime in whose jurisdiction the users are situated. To do so would result in also removing its ability to serve those end-users. A merchant wallet and the content it hosts, if desiring to make possible prohibited conduct, can move itself to an alternate jurisdiction that does not disallow the illicit conduct. For instance, a merchant wallet that wishes to implement access to Internet gambling can locate itself in a jurisdiction where these activities[[6]](#_ftn2) are legal and thus legitimised. This in effect places these organisations beyond the jurisdiction and capability of the majority international legal edicts and the related enforcement capabilities[[7]](#_ftn3). The user wallet and system, though, are not beyond this reach. A user wallet that is accessed and/or located in London with local clients that allows its clients to connect after exchanging payment to a child pornography site in Nigeria links to the user in London and can be used to trace this activity. The miner is unable to determine this level of transaction use, whereas a wallet provider and others could limit such access, as can intermediary ISPs who provide the conduit.

- Identity Verification: The first step is establishing a verified identity for the individual or entity claiming digital asset ownership. This process would involve traditional means of identity verification, such as government-issued identification documents, biometric data, or other trusted methods. - Root Key Generation: Once the identity is verified, a root key is generated for that identity. This root key serves as the foundation for establishing ownership of digital assets. - Asset Registration: The asset is registered within the cryptographic framework to link a specific digital asset to the verified identity. This registration process includes creating a unique identifier for the asset and associating it with the verified identity’s root key. - Digital Signature: When transferring ownership or asserting control over the digital asset, the verified identity signs a message or transaction using their root key. This creates a digital signature that anyone can verify using the corresponding public key associated with the root key. - Verification and Validation: To validate the cryptographic proof of ownership, anyone can verify the digital signature using the public key associated with the root key. By confirming that the signature matches the registered asset and the verified identity, the ownership claim can be upheld. - Trust and Certification Authorities: While Bitcoin distributes trust, trusted entities can act as certification authorities (CAs) within the framework to establish trust in the system. CAs would verify identities and issue root keys, ensuring the cryptographic proof of ownership aligns with traditional legal definitions.

The Battle of Stalingrad (1942-1943) stands as a testament to the profound influence of geography on the theatre of war. This study embarks on meticulously exploring the unique geographical features of Stalingrad and the consequential impact on military strategy and outcomes. Set against the backdrop of one of World War II’s most grueling confrontations, the research delves into the urbanized landscape of Stalingrad, revealing its intricate matrix of challenges and advantages for both the Axis forces and the Soviet Red Army. Beyond the urban realm, the study casts its lens on the strategic importance of the Volga River, an aqueous barrier that simultaneously served as a lifeline for Soviet forces and an impediment to German advances. The crippling Russian winter, with its paralyzing cold and treacherous conditions, is also examined in detail, shedding light on the Axis forces’ ill-preparedness and the subsequent erosion of their operational capabilities. Complementing this geographical analysis, the study also ventures into the economic realm, elucidating Stalingrad’s geography’s economic costs and implications. Additionally, the interplay between geography and information flow is dissected, underscoring the critical role terrain and climate play in disseminating intelligence and orders. In synthesizing such findings, the paper ventures into broader discussions on urban warfare in historical contexts, drawing parallels and distinctions with other significant battles. Ultimately, this study illuminates the inextricable bond between geography, economy, and military strategy, accentuating the importance of understanding this triad in the broader context of warfare.

- Formally define a contract in a manner that can be formally interpreted and implemented by a machine, as well as converted into natural language; - Publish a contract to an audience where the details of the contract can be restricted to authorised entities only, but the knowledge of the existence of the contract is publicly available information. In other words, it can be public knowledge that there is a contract between A and B that anyone can verify, but anything other than its existence is restricted to authorised parties (normally A and B only).i.e. encrypted data on the DHTs (e.g. contract definitions etc.) - Provide a mechanism that allows contracts to be time-bound (i.e. they expire after a certain time or on a given date); condition bound (i.e. they expire once the deliverable specified within the contract has been fulfilled) or open-ended (i.e. they continue to roll on with a notice period to terminate them). - Provide a mechanism to serve notice to terminate that contract in a public fashion. e.g. Using nLockTime + CLTV in a spend transaction to ‘enact’ the expiration. - Provide a mechanism to structure a hierarchy of sub-contracts in a deterministic manner to allow control over different aspects of the contract to be partitioned. For example, on a technology programme, the requirements phase may have a different set of control triggers than the development phase. i.e. chain of hash-linked DHTs.

This study focuses on the analysis of the social interactions between Alice and Bob, their anonymous alias is used here to protect their real identity. The aim is to analyse the interactions between Alice and Bob in the context of their social interaction networks and friendship networks. We introduce the concept of a social interaction network for an individual person, which is social network of everyone whom the selected person talks to. For example, the social interaction network for Alice will include everyone she talks to online. Since Alice interacts with everyone in her social network, therefore the number of edges she contributes to the network is equal the number of friends she has. A reasonable simplification, therefore, is to omit Alice from the network to make network visualization clearer. She is also omitted from the statistical network analysis to make the statistical results consistent with the visualization. We have also created a social network for Bob using the method described above. From visual inspection of the network and the interactions data, we realise that there could be multiple usernames which are similar, and these may represent multiple identities used by same person. Also, users with many friends tend send messages to many people without receiving a reply. This motivates us to improve the original network by consolidating multiple user names, and to remove interactions which only occur in one direction.

- Data Structures: In data structures like linked lists, trees, or graphs, a node represents an individual element or unit of data within the structure. Each node typically contains a value or data payload and one or more references or pointers to other nodes in the structure. Nodes are interconnected to form the underlying structure, enabling efficient data storage and manipulation. - Networks: In networking, a node refers to any device or entity that can send, receive, or forward data over a network. This can include computers, servers, routers, switches, or any other network-enabled device. Each node in a network has a unique address or identifier and plays a role in the transmission and routing of data packets within the network. - Graph Theory: In graph theory, a node (also called a vertex) represents a discrete object or entity within a graph. A graph consists of a set of nodes and edges that connect pairs of nodes. Nodes can represent various entities, such as individuals, cities, or web pages, while edges denote relationships or connections between the nodes. - Distributed Systems: In distributed systems, a node refers to a computing device or server that participates in a distributed network or system. Each node typically has its processing capabilities, storage, and communication capabilities. Nodes collaborate and communicate with each other to perform tasks, share data, and provide services in a decentralized manner.

In this dissertation, I propose to demonstrate that time is not necessarily infinitely divisible; rather, it must occur in finite slices and simultaneously act as a medium to update information throughout the universe. Though time may be relative, the change in entropy at each point provides perspective and presents not merely a system that leaves time as a dimension that matters. As such, I argue that time is effectively a series of clock cycles running a large number of processes that occur in a linked system and that the series does not depend on infinite processes or external worlds. I demonstrate that several theories based on relativity theory are problematic. Notably, the idea of a black hole is based on a collapse into an infinite singularity, yet the slow-down of time can be demonstrated to accelerate faster than the movement of relative time. This means that, under Hawking radiation, the black hole must always devolve into nothingness before collapsing into an infinite singularity. By reenvisioning time, we can unlock new concepts in both philosophy and the physical sciences. The time problem links to infinities, and incorporates some of the problems with Xeno’s paradox. The notion of a universal time allows us to model time as a fundamental condition complemented by a separate model which describes how different rates of entropy change and information development affects the universe.

As was introduced above, another word for unilateral compromise is appeasement. Placation is not something that leads to security, but is instead a slow corruption that eats at the heart of powerful nations and makes them weak. It is not merely nations but corporations and even individuals that lose out through compromise and appeasement. We may not always know the truth, but truth does not compromise. If Galileo, in the full understanding and knowledge of the penalty for heretics, and with a sense that he could face retribution, had not written his treatise, much of the growth attributed to modern society may have stalled. There is a distinction between being stubborn and standing for what is right. We should all be open to new evidence. We should be available for reviewing and testing our knowledge. It is not a compromise to admit that evidence shows us when we are wrong. It is also not a compromise to change our position after being presented with better evidence than we initially had. It is not a compromise to make a win-win deal that is demonstrated to be economically rational. To compromise is merely to give up one’s position based on appeasement. It is the cowardice that leads to seeking peace in the immediate time frame in abeyance of all consideration of what may come.

In that regard, the term “currency” may have different usages in relation to money. In the sense in which I have just used it, the term is a synonym for the medium of exchange itself, namely, coins and bank notes circulating in a particular polity. In another possible usage, the term refers to a characteristic feature of the proprietary regime that applies to money. That is to say, the full force of the general rule on derivate transfers of title does not apply to title to money, in that title to money is exempt from the maxim nemo dat quod non habet. In that regard, currency refers to the negotiability of money, such that, as a general rule, the right to money is inseparable from the possession of it. Where coins or bank notes are delivered in payment of a debt or for the provision of goods or services, it is not incumbent upon the recipient of the coins or bank notes to enquire into the title of the payer. Not only possession of, but also property in, coins and bank notes passes by mere delivery, irrespective of the title of the payer (see Miller v Race (1758) 1 Burrow 452 and David Fox, Property Rights in Money (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2008) at 265–6 and the authorities there cited).

Bitcoin was designed with the combination of simplified payment verification (SPV)—for users—and the ability to act as a node—to earn money, to be paid. Bitcoin, at its base level, is hierarchical. Nodes compete to create blocks of validated transactions. In their blocks, they seek to include as many transactions as possible. Also, in 2008, I said that Bitcoin could already scale to the level of Visa back in the same year. With, on average, 144 blocks a day and 100 GB of transactions, the mean size of a transaction block in 2008 would have been 695 MB. Next, the distribution of transactions will not be even. The distribution of transactions in the Visa network follows a Pareto distribution. As a result, we can calculate that it will be necessary for nodes to be able to handle blocks of up to 11 GB in size. A node would have to handle the most significant possible block size that comes in any particular period of time. It is in the node’s interest to do so, because the larger blocks will carry more fees. The node that collects the block with the most fees earns the largest profit. The hierarchical distribution of nodes was the design of Bitcoin when I created it. The hierarchical structure, which I demonstrated, remains the formation even now.

Bitcoin has an issuer. In January 2009, as director of companies I created in multiple jurisdictions, I issued 21 million bitcoin, where each individual bitcoin is an indivisible set of 100 million tokens. To distribute the tokens (and note the word distribute as it is on the original, unilateral contractual offer [13], presented to nodes that act as agents to my network), I set up a contractual arrangement where nodes (which many people call miners today) act within a set of common rules that I defined. If you don’t like the rules, you are free to create a new cryptocurrency as such involved with Litecoin and Ethereum and others have done. If you negotiate with me, arrangements can be made allowing the continuance of selected copies of my network, with a set of restrictions. In other words, I am willing to license [14] the Bitcoin database. I will do so on my terms. While the terms are rather generous right now, I would prefer others as I have been talked into doing something far more generous than I would desire. I would prefer to take things through court, because I will win as those who are currently challenging me do not know what is about to happen. It is time you learn who created Bitcoin, and it is me.

The analysis demonstrates (Contel & Wójcik, 2019, p. 686) that Brazil’s financial sector has grown considerably since 2000. Yet, in the same time frame, while employment in finance and insurance grew by about 60%, financial sector employment remained around 2% of total employment, which is demonstrated to be unchanged. Furthermore, the results do not delve into real estate or professional services, despite an original focus on such areas. In part, changes are demonstrated to be associated not with the growth of industries as a whole, but with the development of specialisations. The increase in specialised finance and insurance offerings in São Paulo and the decline of such industries in Rio explain some of the changes in the distribution of services. While most industries remained stable (Contel & Wójcik, 2019, p. 687), a significant decline in real estate between 2000 and 2015 was offset by continuing growth in insurance services. The division of specialist services in each location also captures some of the changes in the overall population dynamics in each city. Lastly, the M&A analysis demonstrated a primary concentration within São Paulo. The growth of M&A activity links directly with the growth in associated sectors, and captures some of the economic changes, while adding a deciding factor towards analysing the financial sector value of the region.

The aim of all such changes and the fraudulent airdrop is very simple: it’s an attempt to make a system that acts outside of law, allows terrorist funding, and helps many other scams and frauds. That’s it. And the thing is, it’s very very simple to stop. People are going to wake up one day and not find that the value of their BTC investment is diminishing, but that it is zero. When such types of crime coins end, they don’t end slowly — they end in an instant. One moment you will be looking at US$8000 per coin, the next global trading will be suspended. More importantly, miners who seek to violate such orders will find themselves incarcerated, and they will find their equipment seized. They will be allowed to stop mining BTC and continue mining other coins. They will then simply move from scams such as BTC onto Bitcoin and recover some of the losses. It is, of course, why the scam-coin (BTC) developers at Core seek to try to manipulate the system and remove miners — they want to make it harder to stop, but the problem is: Bitcoin is resilient to what they intend to do. The crime-coin attack is one of the things I spent years working on stopping.

As with other followers of Saint-Simon and Hegel, such as Marx, Western post-enlightenment teaching sought to both discover the science of humanity as David Hume had sought to conceive it and integrate the science of history in “historism�?, in a manner analogous to what Hayek would refer to as “scientism�?.[[13]](#_ftn13) U.S. President Woodrow Wilson embraced such concepts of progress, seeing them as a way to use academic knowledge and the ideas of an intellectual elite to create a system that would propel society forward.[[14]](#_ftn14) Yet, it was the introduction of German philosophical concepts designed to “fix society�?, using methodologies such as Bismarckian state socialism, that promoted the concept of a “third way�?, a theory of reconciling right-wing and left-wing opponents, in a manner that John Maynard Keynes would later promote.[[15]](#_ftn15) Keynes argued that the government needed to intervene in capitalist systems to regulate them. This led to a middle-way path between socialism and laissez-faire economics.[[16]](#_ftn16) In addition, the economic concept of “progressivism�? was promoted as a methodology that would remove the predations of laissez-faire capitalism and stop the control of individuals in a plutocracy.[[17]](#_ftn17) Unlike de Tocqueville, who saw economic freedom as one of America’s greatest strengths[[18]](#_ftn18), the progressivist movement saw the state replacing local communities and individually founded civic organisations with “coercive philanthropy�?.[[19]](#_ftn19)

I cannot make you think, but I can ask you to. When such flimflam men tell you they have knowledge of the system and know which way prices will go, ask yourself why they are not making lots of money but, instead, are working to promote flimflam. If their system is so good, why are they giving away everything they could earn so that you can invest your money into the sudden wealth that they have altruistically walked away from? It does not matter whether you like me, it does not matter whether you think I am honest or dishonest or anything else; I’m not trying to sell you anything. I am simply trying to get you to think. I know it is a hard task for some people. I am not promising fast-earned wealth; I am simply telling you that such people have no idea outside the Ponzi they are creating to take your money. I know it seems strange in a world of people seeking to grab everything you own, but think for a moment: would it not be better to investigate the so-called Internet promotions that promise prices will go up a million times, rather than simply listening to people who are half the time close to being broke themselves?

There is a discussion within the literature as to the degrees of oligopoly and monopoly. Such forms of strategy analysis go as far as to compare business to warfare in a false dichotomy. The reality is binary. Either a firm is independent or it is acting jointly. A firm that is acting jointly, whether partially or in full, is part of a cartel. A firm that is independent is not part of a cartel. No other alternative can exist. We demonstrate above that perfect elasticity cannot exist, and hence any differentiation discussing firm size or differentiation strategies can be demonstrated to be irrelevant. It is a question of economic history, not economic scrutiny. The real firm, not the hypothetical, has a model of expectations concerning how many of its products it can sell at a set price to a consumer (Golgan, 2011). This real-world client is not interested in what consumer demand may be in hypothetical but non-existent scenarios. Such models include expected changes to revenue, should alternate prices be set to market, and any firm, not just a monopoly or oligopoly, will take the reactions of its competitors into account when pricing customer demand for a product. A firm that ignores such strategic decisions will go out of business.

Dreyfuss (2020, p. 9) contends that “because intermediaries are risk-averse, the threat of liability can lead them to remove material from their platforms even when under the law, the use is considered fair and not compensable” (Dreyfuss, 2020, p. 9). Dreyfuss (2020) further highlights the challenges that open-source Blockchain developers and open-source software structures face when they fail to implement protection against corporate controls and configurations. The author emphasizes that intermediaries, such as platforms or internet service providers, tend to be risk-averse to avoid potential liability. As a result, even if a particular use of copyrighted material is considered fair and not compensable under the law, intermediaries may remove such material from their platforms due to the threat of legal repercussions (Dreyfuss, 2020, p. 9). This situation can have adverse consequences for open-source developers who rely on the freedom to use and share copyrighted content within the boundaries of fair use. Furthermore, it underscores the need for open-source developers to navigate the complexities of intellectual property laws and corporate interests to ensure their work remains protected and accessible. Therefore, properly implementing legal safeguards and understanding the intersection between partnership law, open-source development, and intellectual property rights are crucial for maintaining the integrity and sustainability of open-source Blockchain projects (Dreyfuss, 2020).

Banks are not an evil, and Bitcoin does not replace banking. The US government promoted policies that led to the collapse in 2008. In allowing people to take out loans that exceeded the value of equity in their property, government did not help people to get a foot on the property ladder, it helped corrupt bankers to take the little that the same people had. There is value in saving. Having to save 20% before you have a home loan granted is a chore and an effort, but it is a necessary one. It was not banking that was at fault, it was the policies designed to appease a small class of people in a vain attempt at delivering short-term political wins. It can be difficult for people to save, but it is also essential. Wishing away the problems in society does not solve the problems in society. Saving a deposit for a home is no different than having to cut down the calories you consume and exercise more; it is a necessary chore, a hygiene factor, and for people to successfully build a future, they must learn that virtue and vigilance are not always easy. The false promises of easy riches generally end in pain and tears.

Coins remain legal tender without having an economic basis in specie. They hence, as with paper notes, rest on the fiat declaration of a sovereign in the vast majority of existing states (if not indeed all modern states). In the US, UK, and Europe, the respective central bank notes and circulating notes of the respective are decreed to be legal tender “for all debts, public charges, and dues.” At the same time, gold and silver coins are no longer considered legal tender for debts. They do remain as private money, and may be used where agreement is held between the parties, though. We would move that bitcoin, as a commodity money, forms a private money in the nature of other private specie-based monies including coined gold and silver. So, it may be held that bitcoin is not currency. The setting of paper notes as the only category of current money (1) in the narrow sense is more an issue of public policy than of use, and can be seen as a result of a political desire to control the money supply. We may take the law of payment systems to show only a single limitation, the making of state-sanctioned bank notes as the only form of legal tender.

Bob can quickly check the validity of any coin that Alice is using to pay him. He can check whether it’s in the UTXO set as an unspent transaction, and he can quickly validate the input location in the blockchain as Alice has handed him the path. The deeper the coin is, the more the proof of work is that is needed to change the path and hence the more secure it is for Bob to accept it. If Alice simply spends her pay and receives coins after being validated for an hour or so, it is still very secure. Bob does not need to download the entire blockchain. Even if he ran his own node, it would gain him nothing. Only miners change the blockchain. As Bob has received Alice’s input coin, he can check that it is valid and that she has correctly formulated the output coin to Bob, which is all he needs to validate the payment itself. Next, if Alice hands the Merkle path associated with her coin to Bob, she can now be assured that Bob can quickly validate it by hashing the input transaction and checking its location on the hash headers, by validating the Merkle path she has given him.

Bobby was very enthusiastic about his product, which is a good thing whenever you’re developing something, but it’s also important to understand the system and the market you’re developing for. In the 1990s, a company called Mondex released a form of cryptocurrency based on prepaid smart cards. Unlike the Ballet system Bobby has released, the Mondex system was quite secure. It allowed amounts to be transferred on and off the card, and protected keys very well. Having analysed both physical and IT security systems for several decades, I can estimate the cost of counterfeiting and of taking a key and reapplying the protective coating. The cost at bulk would be between two and four US dollars for each card. As such, cards could be issued where the private keys have been extracted. It would allow an attacker to sell the card knowing that at a future time, they would be able to recoup any “investment” where on average each card they give out returns more than four dollars. But, the cost of the card makes it infeasible that it will be used for anything under $20. More importantly, it results in the user having to entrust the company developing the product with never saving the keys.

Point — 3 54 Stat. 853, as amended, 15 U. S. C. (Supp. IV) § 80b-9, provides in relevant part that: “(e) Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person has engaged, is engaged, or is about to engage in any act or practice constituting a violation of any provision of this subchapter, or of any rule, regulation, or order hereunder, or that any person has aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, or procured, is aiding, abetting, counseling, commanding, inducing, or procuring, or is about to aid, abet, counsel, command, induce, or procure such a violation, it may in its discretion bring an action in the proper district court of the United States, or the proper United States court of any Territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, to enjoin such acts or practices and to enforce compliance with this subchapter of any rule, regulation, or order hereunder. Upon a showing that such person has engaged, is engaged, or is about to engage in any such act or practice, or in aiding, abetting, counseling, commanding, inducing, or procuring any such act or practice, a permanent or temporary injunction or decree or restraining order shall be granted without bond.”

As a thought experiment, it is simple to understand that cash is itself a peer-to-peer system—not because of the mint function but because of the exchange of bills between individuals. Bitcoin allows for a distributed distribution function. The distribution of clearing and settlement functions such that individuals may transact on Bitcoin in a manner analogous to using cash. It comes with all the required rules that come with cash. Most importantly, the implementation of rules is not something that a small group of developers and businesses gets to set. Bitcoin is not a system based on votes by an anonymous group that controls a system outside of government and regulatory systems. Miners are easy to detect, and it is simple for a government to act against a rogue miner. The same principle applies even when it comes to the other aspects of the Bitcoin ecosystem; exchanges are simple to interact with. There is no such thing as a decentralized exchange (DEX). The concept of the distributed exchange is but a concept. Every single exchange performs as a custodial service. Government can easily interact with any blockchain system because the individuals involved in setting and maintaining and enforcing the rules are always visible.

Point — 2 — 54 Stat. 852, as amended, 15 U. S. C. (Supp. IV) § 80b-6, provides in relevant part that: “It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser, by use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly — “(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or prospective client; “(2) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client; “(3) acting as principal for his own account, knowingly to sell any security to or purchase any security from a client, or acting as broker for a person other than such client, knowingly to effect any sale or purchase of any security for the account of such client, without disclosing to such client in writing before the completion of such transaction the capacity in which he is acting and obtaining the consent of the client to such transaction. The prohibitions of this paragraph shall not apply to any transaction with a customer of a broker or dealer if such broker or dealer is not acting as an investment adviser in relation to such transaction […].”

The public-ruling database of the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) has the anonymised version of my claim. In looking at it, the tax office quickly realised how easy it would be to abuse the GST system if GST was applied to Bitcoin. Which was of course the point I was trying to make. Unfortunately at the time, I was a rather brash individual, and rather than allowing my lawyers to deal with the matter correctly, I pulled such a little stunt to force their hand. It did. It was very quickly considered and rejected out of hand. The invoice leading to a debt was reversed, and had to be re-entered without GST. So effectively, I bought and sold bitcoin to myself over the border, and the result was that the Australian government rejected imposing GST on Bitcoin. In 2013, we had been discussing the same matter in roundtables and at conferences. I’d met with commissioners and the deputies, and we had been getting nowhere. It was actually looking as if they would impose GST. Rather than spending years trying to focus an effort, I chose the quickest and nastiest way of making them see just how foolish such a thing would be.

The question is, what is gained — at least in the misguided belief of the developers seeking to introduce Schnorr? The belief is that, in not allowing Alice to definitively know who she is dealing with, the parties will be able to have a level of plausible deniability under the law. In theory, such developers believe that they can circumvent the legal process, and create a coin that will work on a dark web allowing drug sales in the manner that Silk Road promised. It, again, is utter bull. It’s the same fallacy that misguided attempts to lose records such as the Lightning Network keep proposing. Such developers and associated fools fail to understand that legislation such as the FinCEN (BSA) Bank Secrecy Act requires that records are maintained and that the mere act of deleting them is enough to make their system illegal. More importantly, it does not deliver plausible deniability. The exchanges between parties can be captured allowing evidential proof and the association of individuals with multiple transactions. And the fact that you are part of a signature whilst not allowing legality for non-persons to sign and be bound conversely delivers evidence when used in criminal trials.

The cannons had been paying Mansell six marks annually on Easter over to terms in a system where the diploma contains dating clauses that use the Roman system of ides, nones and kalends.[[8]](#_ftn8) This dating system is based on reference to festival days to the offices of the magistrates and assemblies as per the Roman system. The change in payment terms is that rather than being paid into terms at St. Michael’s Easters, the rent is now due to be paid in one term at Easter. In addition, there is an exchange between Robert’s heir Stephan and Hugh’s son Hugh. Hugh gave Stephan land in Broughton in exchange for 4 marks’ worth of land in the soke of Cheneborlay, in Carlton. Four marks represented a measure of weight for gold and silver coins and were equivalent to 8 ounces, but as Macleod notes, after the Norman conquest, this was used as a unit of account in England and exchanged for 160 pence or two-thirds of a pound sterling per Mark.[[9]](#_ftn9) The National archives currency converter notes that four marks would be equivalent to 48 stones of wool, thirty-seven quarters of wheat or 600 days’ pay for a skilled tradesman.[[10]](#_ftn10)

Understanding the distinction between open source and the public domain is essential when discussing Bitcoin and its associated intellectual property rights. Bitcoin’s open-source nature, as permitted by the MIT License, fosters collaboration, innovation, and transparency within the Bitcoin community (Heron, Hanson, & Ricketts, 2013). Yet, it is crucial to recognize that the concept of open source does not equate to the public domain. The public domain encompasses works that are not subject to intellectual property rights, while Bitcoin’s open-source status operates within the framework of copyright protection (Lerner & Tirole, 2005). This differentiation has legal implications, as the open-source licensing of Bitcoin allows users to access, modify, and distribute the source code but does not relinquish the intellectual property rights associated with Bitcoin and its development (Stokes, 2019). It is important to navigate such legal complexities, considering that other forms of intellectual property, including database rights, operate independently from copyright and may have their own legal considerations (Lindberg, 2008; Coleman, 2009). Recognizing the nuances between open source, copyright, and other intellectual property rights is crucial for developers, users, and the broader Bitcoin community to ensure compliance, foster innovation, and respect the intellectual property protections embedded in the Bitcoin ecosystem.

As explained in the paragraph, Bitcoin is not itself about “one-CPU-one-vote”. Bitcoin and proof-of-work are not about ‘one-person-one-vote’. In fact, no blockchain is about democratic voting. Information can be securely recorded on the blockchain, which is not the same as saying that nodes vote democratically. The voting by nodes is a form of plutocracy. What keeps the system honest is that there are only two choices: follow the rules or become an attacker. Voting by wealthy individuals or corporations only would be problematic if it were not for the fact that Bitcoin publishes all the evidence associated with an attack for use by any individual. As a result, if a system attacks the network, the operator forfeits the capital they have invested in their nodes. So, the idea is not to allow any level of voting on the protocol. Nodes act to confirm and enforce the original protocol. Some people will tell you otherwise; they seek to change the scenario, because they can gain power and wealth in doing so. In understanding that Bitcoin does not allow such a change, and that they are trying to replace Bitcoin with something else, you can start to see their tactics.